

The Intensional-Extensional Problem in Probabilistic Databases

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October 16th, 2023

Probabilistic Circuits and Logic workshop

Inria



1. Recap from Dan Suciu's talk
 - Tuple-independent probabilistic databases
 - Provenance and knowledge compilation
 - The Intensional-Extensional problem
2. Solving the problem for a specific class of UCQs
3. The non-cancelling intersections conjecture

Recap from Dan Suciu's talk

Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

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$$\Pr(D') = (1 - 0.5) \times 1 \times (1 - 0.2) \times 0.7$$

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(not efficient)

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$$\Pr(D \models q) = 1 - \left[(1 - 0.5)(1 - 0.2)(1 - 0.7) + 0.5(1 - 0.2)(1 - 0.7) \right. \\ \left. + (1 - 0.5)0.2(1 - 0.7) + (1 - 0.5)(1 - 0.2)0.7 \right]$$

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Definition: problem PQE(q), for q a Boolean query

Input: a tuple-independent probabilistic database D

Output: $\Pr(D \models q)$

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 - **Inclusion–exclusion**: $\Pr(A \vee B \vee C \vee \dots) = \Pr(A) + \Pr(B) + \dots - \Pr(A \wedge B) - \Pr(A \wedge C) - \dots + \Pr(A \wedge B \wedge C) + \dots$

Definition

The **provenance** $\text{Prov}(q, I)$ of query q on database D is the Boolean function with facts of D as variables and such that for every valuation $\tau : D \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, $\text{Prov}(q, D)$ evaluates to TRUE under τ if and only if $\{f \in D \mid \tau(f) = 1\} \models q$

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Possible representations:

- Boolean formulas
- Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs, FBDDs, etc)
- Boolean circuits

Provenance: example

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
$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prov}(q, D) = & [L(A, B) \wedge L(B, B)] \\ & \vee [L(A, B) \wedge L(J, B)] \\ & \vee [L(B, B) \wedge L(J, B)]\end{aligned}$$

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


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We have $\Pr(D \models q) = \Pr(\text{Prov}(q, D) = \text{true})$

Provenance in knowledge compilation formalisms

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-
- Dan Suciu's talk: the safe UCQs for which this is possible with OBDDs are exactly the **inversion-free** UCQs
- This talk: what about d-Ds?

What are deterministic and decomposable circuits (d-Ds)?

Let C be a Boolean circuit

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
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 - the circuit C is a d-D if all its \wedge -gates are decomposable and all its \vee -gates are deterministic
- To obtain the probability, replace \wedge -gates by \times , \vee -gates by $+$, \neg -gates by $1 - x$, and evaluate. In other words, use the following rules:
- **Independence**: $\Pr(A \wedge B) = \Pr(A) \times \Pr(B)$ when A, B are independent events
 - **Negation**: $\Pr(\neg A) = 1 - \Pr(A)$
 - **Disjoint Events**: $\Pr(A \vee B) = \Pr(A) + \Pr(B)$ for A, B disjoint events

d-Ds: example

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For every safe UCQ q , can we compute in PTIME its provenance on a database D as a **deterministic and decomposable circuit**?

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In other words, can we replace the inclusion–exclusion rule by the disjunction rule?

- This approach is more **modular** than Dalvi and Suciu’s original algorithm for safe UCQs, and it would allow us to do more than probabilistic evaluation: **enumerate the satisfying states of the data, compute the satisfying state of the data that is most probable, update the tuples’ probabilities**, etc.

**Solving the problem for a specific
class of UCQs**

Main result from PODS'20

- Focus on a class of UCQs, denoted \mathcal{H} (defined next slide)
- It had been conjectured that for some safe queries $q \in \mathcal{H}$, the provenance of q cannot be computed in PTIME as d-Ds
 - because these are the simplest queries for which Dalvi and Suciu's algorithm uses **inclusion–exclusion**
 - because this conjecture had been proven for more restricted formalisms of knowledge compilation (d-SDNNFs, dec-DNNFs)

Main result

For every (fixed) safe query $q \in \mathcal{H}$, being given as input a database D , we can compute in PTIME a d-D that represents $\text{Prov}(q, D)$.

The \mathcal{H} queries

- Let $k \geq 1$ and R, S_1, \dots, S_k, T be pairwise distinct relational predicates, with R and T unary and S_i binary. Define the queries $h_{k,i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq k$:

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 - $h_{k,0} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \exists x \exists y R(x) \wedge S_1(x, y)$;
 - $h_{k,i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \exists x \exists y S_i(x, y) \wedge S_{i+1}(x, y)$ for $1 \leq i < k$;
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- $\mathcal{H}_k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{the set of UCQs that can be formed from the queries } h_{k,i}, \text{ i.e., positive Boolean combinations of those queries}$
- $\mathcal{H} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \bigcup_{k=1}^{\infty} \mathcal{H}_k$


Proof technique (1/4): representing \mathcal{H} queries

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
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
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- each node $v \subseteq [k]$ of the graph represents a **subquery** $q_v \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\bigwedge_{\ell \in v} h_{k,\ell}) \wedge (\bigwedge_{\ell \in [k] \setminus v} \neg h_{k,\ell})$. (Note that q_v is not a UCQ)



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
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


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- (in particular, every database D satisfies **exactly one** subquery q_v)
- some nodes are **colored**, and $q =$ the disjunction of the subqueries q_v that are represented by the colored nodes v

Proof technique (2/4): basic queries

Proposition (Fink & Olteanu [TODS'16])


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


- **Idea:** starting from q , we will **entirely uncolor the graph** by using multiple times the following operations:
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

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- **Idea:** starting from q , we will **entirely uncolor the graph** by using multiple times the following operations:
 - **Uncolor** two adjacent nodes that are colored
 - **Color** two adjacent nodes that were not colored
- Simultaneously, we build a deterministic and decomposable circuit for the provenance of q



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


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



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


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



Then continue with q'

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
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


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


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


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


$$\text{Prov}(q, D) =$$




Then continue with q'


Proof technique (4/4): how to uncolor the graph?




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
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
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
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Proposition

A query $q \in \mathcal{H}_k$ is safe if and only if the two partitions of the graph contain the same number of colored nodes


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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The non-cancelling intersections conjecture


Ongoing work with [Antoine Amarilli](#), [Louis Jachiet](#) and [Dan Suciu](#)

Intersection lattices, Möbius function and Inclusion-Exclusion

- Let $\mathcal{F} = \{S_1, \dots, S_n\}$ be a **finite family of finite sets**, pairwise incomparable
 - **Example:** $\mathcal{F} = \{\{a, b\}, \{a, c\}, \{b, c\}, \{d\}\}$


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
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
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
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
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- Define the **non-cancelling intersections** of \mathcal{F} by
 $\text{NCI}(\mathcal{F}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{I \in \mathbb{L}_{\mathcal{F}} \mid I \neq \top \text{ and } \mu_{\mathcal{F}}(I) \neq 0\}$

Non-cancelling intersections conjecture

- For two sets S, T such that $S \cap T = \emptyset$, define the **disjoint union** $S \dot{\cup} T \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S \cup T$
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Non-cancelling intersections conjecture


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Non-cancelling intersections conjecture (NCI for short)


Let $\mathcal{F} = \{S_1, \dots, S_n\}$ be a finite family of finite sets.

Then $\bigcup_{i=1}^n S_i \in \bullet(\text{NCI}(\mathcal{F}))$.

Example 1




Example 1



→ We have $\bigcup_{i=1}^n S_i = \{a, b, c, d\} = ((\{a\} \dot{\cup} \{b\}) \dot{\cup} \{c\}) \dot{\cup} \{d\}$


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
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That was easy...


Example 2



Example 2



→ We can express $\bigcup_{i=1}^n S_i = \{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h\}$ with:



Conclusion

- We have sketched a proof that we can build in PTIME d-Ds for the provenance of safe queries in the class \mathcal{H}
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Conclusion

- We have sketched a proof that we can build in PTIME d-Ds for the provenance of safe queries in the class \mathcal{H}
- We have stated a more general conjecture about intersection lattices: the **non-cancelling intersections conjecture**
 - Counterexample search by bruteforce: no counterexample so far...
 - We have some partial positive results: a reformulation of the conjecture that works in the Boolean lattices, and a proof for specific subcases of this reformulation

Thanks for your attention!



Nilesh N. Dalvi and Dan Suciu.

The dichotomy of probabilistic inference for unions of conjunctive queries.

Journal of the ACM, 59(6):30, 2012.



Robert Fink and Dan Olteanu.

Dichotomies for queries with negation in probabilistic databases.

ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS), 41(1):4, 2016.



Mikaël Monet.

Solving a special case of the intensional vs extensional conjecture in probabilistic databases.

In *Proceedings of the 39th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of Database Systems*, pages 149–163, 2020.