

# Applications of knowledge compilation to databases counting/probabilistic problems

---

**Mikaël Monet**

May 26th, 2026

Dagstuhl seminar #26221: *Knowledge Compilation in Artificial Intelligence, Databases, and Formal Methods*


The logo for Inria, featuring the word "Inria" in a stylized, red, cursive script font.

# Introduction

Dan Olteanu's talk: using **multi-valued** circuits (a.k.a. *factorized databases*) to represent query results

$q(x, y)$  = a query with **free vars**

$D$  = a database




# Introduction

Dan Olteanu's talk: using **multi-valued** circuits (a.k.a. *factorized databases*) to represent query results

This talk: using **Boolean** circuits for problems that can be solved via *Boolean provenance*


$q(x, y)$  = a query with **free vars**

$D$  = a database



$q$ : a **Boolean** query

$D$  = a database



1. Boolean provenance
2. Probabilistic databases
  - Compiling hierarchical conjunctive queries
  - Compiling MSO queries on tree-like data
3. Other problems: Shapley values, resilience
4. ProvSQL teaser

## Boolean provenance

---

- A (relational) **database**  $D$ : a finite set of *facts/tuples*
  - **Example:**  $D = \{R(a, b), R(b, c), S(b, b, a)\}$
- A **Boolean query**  $q$ : a function that maps databases to **true** or **false**
  - **Example:**  $q =$  “the database contains at least 10 facts”

- A (relational) **database**  $D$ : a finite set of *facts/tuples*
  - **Example:**  $D = \{R(a, b), R(b, c), S(b, b, a)\}$
- A **Boolean query**  $q$ : a function that maps databases to **true** or **false**
  - **Example:**  $q =$  “the database contains at least 10 facts”

## Definition [Imielinski & Lipski 1984]

The **Boolean provenance**  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  is the Boolean function with facts of  $D$  as variables and such that, for any  $D' \subseteq D$ ,  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  evaluates to true on  $D'$  if and only if  $D' \models q$

## Boolean provenance: example

Likes

	Alice	Bob
$D =$	Alice	John
	Bob	Bob
	John	Bob

$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$   
("there are two people who like the same person")

## Boolean provenance: example

### Likes

	Alice	Bob
$D =$	Alice	John
	Bob	Bob
	John	Bob

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prov}(q, D) = & [L(A, B) \wedge L(B, B)] \\ & \vee [L(A, B) \wedge L(J, B)] \\ & \vee [L(B, B) \wedge L(J, B)]\end{aligned}$$


$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$   
("there are two people who like the same person")

## Boolean provenance: example

### Likes

	Alice	Bob
$D =$	Alice	John
	Bob	Bob
	John	Bob

$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$   
("there are two people who like the same person")




## Boolean provenance: example

### Likes

	Alice	Bob
$D =$	Alice	John
	Bob	Bob
	John	Bob

$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$   
("there are two people who like the same person")




If  $q$  is an FO sentence ( $\simeq$  an SQL Boolean query), what is the data complexity of computing  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$ ?

## Boolean provenance: example

### Likes

	Alice	Bob
$D =$	Alice	John
	Bob	Bob
	John	Bob

$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$   
("there are two people who like the same person")



If  $q$  is an FO sentence ( $\simeq$  an SQL Boolean query), what is the data complexity of computing  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$ ? **PTIME**

# Probabilistic databases

---

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty  
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

$$D =$$

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty  
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

$$D' =$$

Likes		p
		0.5
Alice	John	1
		0.2
John	Bob	0.7

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty  
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

Likes		p
		0.5
Alice	John	1
		0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$$\Pr(D') = (1 - 0.5) \times 1 \times (1 - 0.2) \times 0.7$$

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty  
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

$D =$

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$q =$  “there are two people who like the same person”

$$\exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty  
→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$q =$  “there are two people who like the same person”

$$\exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

$$\Pr(D \models q) = \sum_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ D' \models q}} \Pr(D')$$

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty

→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$q$  = “there are two people who like the same person”

$$\exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

$$\Pr(D \models q) = \sum_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ D' \models q}} \Pr(D') \quad (\text{not efficient})$$

# Tuple-independent probabilistic databases

- **Probabilistic databases:** to represent data uncertainty

→ simplest formalism: **tuple-independent database**

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$q$  = “there are two people who like the same person”

$\exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$

Queries with free variables?  $q(s, t) = \dots$

$$\Pr(D \models q) = \sum_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ D' \models q}} \Pr(D') \quad (\text{not efficient})$$

## Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

## Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prov}(q, D) = & [L(A, B) \wedge L(B, B)] \\ & \vee [L(A, B) \wedge L(J, B)] \\ & \vee [L(B, B) \wedge L(J, B)]\end{aligned}$$

$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

## Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prov}(q, D) = & [L(A, B) \wedge L(B, B)] \\ & \vee [L(A, B) \wedge L(J, B)] \\ & \vee [L(B, B) \wedge L(J, B)]\end{aligned}$$

$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

We have  $\Pr(D \models q) = \Pr(\text{Prov}(q, D) = \text{true})$

## Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$$\text{Prov}(q, D) = [L(A, B) \wedge L(B, B)] \\ \vee [L(A, B) \wedge L(J, B)] \\ \vee [L(B, B) \wedge L(J, B)]$$

$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$


We have  $\Pr(D \models q) = \Pr(\text{Prov}(q, D) = \text{true})$

Computing the probability of an arbitrary circuit is **#P-hard**!

# Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$D =$



$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

We have  $\Pr(D \models q) = \Pr(\text{Prov}(q, D) = \text{true})$


Computing the probability of an arbitrary circuit is **#P-hard**!

What if we can compute a **decomposable deterministic circuit (d-D)** efficiently?

# Boolean provenance to the rescue!

Likes		p
Alice	Bob	0.5
Alice	John	1
Bob	Bob	0.2
John	Bob	0.7

$D =$



$$q = \exists x, y, z : L(x, z) \wedge L(y, z) \wedge x \neq y$$

We have  $\Pr(D \models q) = \Pr(\text{Prov}(q, D) = \text{true})$

Computing the probability of an arbitrary circuit is **#P-hard**!

What if we can compute a **decomposable deterministic circuit (d-D)** efficiently?

$\implies$  PTIME

## The probabilistic query evaluation problem ( $\text{PQE}(q)$ )

**Definition:** problem  $\text{PQE}(q)$ , for  $q$  a Boolean query

**Input:** a tuple-independent probabilistic database  $D$

**Output:**  $\Pr(D \models q)$

# The probabilistic query evaluation problem ( $\text{PQE}(q)$ )

**Definition:** problem  $\text{PQE}(q)$ , for  $q$  a Boolean query

**Input:** a tuple-independent probabilistic database  $D$

**Output:**  $\Pr(D \models q)$

- Dalvi and Suciu [JACM'12] have shown a **dichotomy** on the (data) complexity of  $\text{PQE}(q)$  for **unions of conjunctive queries**:
  - either  $\text{PQE}(q) \in \text{PTIME}$ , and  $q$  is called “**safe**”
  - or  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is  **$\text{FP}^{\#P}$ -hard**, and  $q$  is called “**unsafe**”

# The probabilistic query evaluation problem (PQE( $q$ ))

**Definition:** problem PQE( $q$ ), for  $q$  a Boolean query

**Input:** a tuple-independent probabilistic database  $D$

**Output:**  $\Pr(D \models q)$

- Dalvi and Suciu [JACM'12] have shown a **dichotomy** on the (data) complexity of PQE( $q$ ) for **unions of conjunctive queries**:
  - either  $\text{PQE}(q) \in \text{PTIME}$ , and  $q$  is called “safe”
  - or  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is **FP<sup>#P</sup>-hard**, and  $q$  is called “unsafe”
- Their algorithm for a safe query  $q$  essentially uses three rules:
  - **Independence**:  $\Pr(A \wedge B) = \Pr(A) \times \Pr(B)$  when  $A, B$  are independent events

# The probabilistic query evaluation problem ( $\text{PQE}(q)$ )

**Definition:** problem  $\text{PQE}(q)$ , for  $q$  a Boolean query

**Input:** a tuple-independent probabilistic database  $D$

**Output:**  $\Pr(D \models q)$

- Dalvi and Suciu [JACM'12] have shown a **dichotomy** on the (data) complexity of  $\text{PQE}(q)$  for **unions of conjunctive queries**:
  - either  $\text{PQE}(q) \in \text{PTIME}$ , and  $q$  is called “safe”
  - or  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is  **$\text{FP}^{\#P}$ -hard**, and  $q$  is called “unsafe”
- Their algorithm for a safe query  $q$  essentially uses three rules:
  - **Independence**:  $\Pr(A \wedge B) = \Pr(A) \times \Pr(B)$  when  $A, B$  are independent events
  - **Negation**:  $\Pr(\neg A) = 1 - \Pr(A)$

# The probabilistic query evaluation problem (PQE( $q$ ))

**Definition:** problem PQE( $q$ ), for  $q$  a Boolean query

**Input:** a tuple-independent probabilistic database  $D$

**Output:**  $\Pr(D \models q)$

- Dalvi and Suciu [JACM'12] have shown a **dichotomy** on the (data) complexity of PQE( $q$ ) for **unions of conjunctive queries**:
  - either  $\text{PQE}(q) \in \text{PTIME}$ , and  $q$  is called “**safe**”
  - or  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is  **$\text{FP}^{\#P}$ -hard**, and  $q$  is called “**unsafe**”
- Their algorithm for a safe query  $q$  essentially uses three rules:
  - **Independence**:  $\Pr(A \wedge B) = \Pr(A) \times \Pr(B)$  when  $A, B$  are independent events
  - **Negation**:  $\Pr(\neg A) = 1 - \Pr(A)$
  - **Inclusion-exclusion**:  
$$\Pr(A \vee B \vee C \vee \dots) = \Pr(A) + \Pr(B) + \dots - \Pr(A \wedge B) - \Pr(A \wedge C) - \dots + \Pr(A \wedge B \wedge C) + \dots$$

## An open problem

- If  $q$  is a **safe UCQ** (i.e.,  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME), can we compute  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  as a **d-D** in PTIME?
  - This is not known! (See [this arXiv note] for a reformulation as a conjecture about inclusion-exclusion)

## An open problem

- If  $q$  is a **safe UCQ** (i.e.,  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME), can we compute  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  as a **d-D** in PTIME?
  - This is not known! (See [this arXiv note] for a reformulation as a conjecture about inclusion-exclusion)
- But we know this can be done, for instance, when  $q$  is a **hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query**
  - We prove this next

## Hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query

- A **conjunctive query (CQ)**: an existentially quantified conjunction of atoms  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge R(y, x) \wedge S(x, x)$

## Hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query

- A **conjunctive query (CQ)**: an existentially quantified conjunction of atoms  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge R(y, x) \wedge S(x, x)$
- **self-join free CQ**: no repetition of relational symbols  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge S(y, x) \wedge T(x, x)$

## Hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query

- A **conjunctive query (CQ)**: an existentially quantified conjunction of atoms  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge R(y, x) \wedge S(x, x)$
- **self-join free CQ**: no repetition of relational symbols  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge S(y, x) \wedge T(x, x)$

### **Theorem [Dalvi & Suciu 2004]**

Let  $q$  be a Boolean self-join free CQ. If  $q$  is **hierarchical** then  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME, otherwise it is #P-hard

## Hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query

- A **conjunctive query (CQ)**: an existentially quantified conjunction of atoms  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge R(y, x) \wedge S(x, x)$
- **self-join free CQ**: no repetition of relational symbols  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge S(y, x) \wedge T(x, x)$

### Theorem [Dalvi & Suciu 2004]

Let  $q$  be a Boolean self-join free CQ. If  $q$  is **hierarchical** then  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME, otherwise it is #P-hard

- **Definition:**  $q$  is **hierarchical** if, for every  $x, y \in \text{vars}(q)$ , we have either  $\text{atoms}_q(x) \subseteq \text{atoms}_q(y)$ , or  $\text{atoms}_q(y) \subseteq \text{atoms}_q(x)$ , or  $\text{atoms}_q(x) \cap \text{atoms}_q(y) = \emptyset$

## Hierarchical self-join free conjunctive query

- A **conjunctive query (CQ)**: an existentially quantified conjunction of atoms  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge R(y, x) \wedge S(x, x)$
- **self-join free CQ**: no repetition of relational symbols  
→ **Example:**  $q = \exists x y : R(x, y) \wedge S(y, x) \wedge T(x, x)$

### Theorem [Dalvi & Suciu 2004]

Let  $q$  be a Boolean self-join free CQ. If  $q$  is **hierarchical** then  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME, otherwise it is #P-hard

- **Definition:**  $q$  is **hierarchical** if, for every  $x, y \in \text{vars}(q)$ , we have either  $\text{atoms}_q(x) \subseteq \text{atoms}_q(y)$ , or  $\text{atoms}_q(y) \subseteq \text{atoms}_q(x)$ , or  $\text{atoms}_q(x) \cap \text{atoms}_q(y) = \emptyset$

→ Proof of this **on board**, using d-Ds for the tractability side ←

## Monadic second-order logic on treelike data (1/2)

What if  $q$  is not safe? Can we recover tractability by restricting the set of databases?

## Monadic second-order logic on treelike data (1/2)

What if  $q$  is not safe? Can we recover tractability by restricting the set of databases?

- **Monadic second-order logic (MSO)**: like FO but we have monadic (representing sets of elements) variables

→ **Example:**

$$q = \exists X : (\text{Bob} \in X)$$

$$\wedge (\forall y, z : y \in X \wedge \text{Likes}(y, z) \implies z \in X)$$

$$\wedge \forall X' : [(\text{Bob} \in X')$$

$$\wedge (\forall y, z : y \in X' \wedge \text{Likes}(y, z) \implies z \in X')$$

$$\implies X \subseteq X')$$

$$\wedge \text{Alice} \in X$$

## Monadic second-order logic on treelike data (1/2)

What if  $q$  is not safe? Can we recover tractability by restricting the set of databases?

- **Monadic second-order logic (MSO)**: like FO but we have monadic (representing sets of elements) variables

→ **Example:**

$$\begin{aligned}q = & \exists X : (\text{Bob} \in X) \\ & \wedge (\forall y, z : y \in X \wedge \text{Likes}(y, z) \implies z \in X) \\ & \wedge \forall X' : [(\text{Bob} \in X') \\ & \quad \wedge (\forall y, z : y \in X' \wedge \text{Likes}(y, z) \implies z \in X') \\ & \quad \implies X \subseteq X'] \\ & \wedge \text{Alice} \in X\end{aligned}$$

- **Treewidth of a database**: a measure indicating how close the database is to a tree

### Theorem [Amarilli, Bourhis & Senellart 2016]

Let  $q$  be a Boolean MSO query, and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME when restricted to databases of treewidth  $\leq k$ . Moreover we can build d-Ds in PTIME representing the provenance.

### Theorem [Amarilli, Bourhis & Senellart 2016]

Let  $q$  be a Boolean MSO query, and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then  $\text{PQE}(q)$  is PTIME when restricted to databases of treewidth  $\leq k$ . Moreover we can build d-Ds in PTIME representing the provenance.

→ Proof (sketch) of this [on board](#), using tree automata to build d-Ds ←

Other problems: Shapley values,  
resilience

---

## Shapley values (1/2)

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database,  $f \in D$  a fact of  $D$
- We want to measure the contribution of  $f$  to  $q(D)$

## Shapley values (1/2)

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database,  $f \in D$  a fact of  $D$
- We want to measure the **contribution of  $f$  to  $q(D)$** 
  - We can use the established notion of **Shapley** value from cooperative game theory

**Definition [Livshits, Bertossi, Kimelfeld, & Sebag 2020]**

$$\text{Shapley}(q, D, f) = \sum_{S \subseteq D \setminus \{f\}} \frac{|S|!(|D| - |S| - 1)!}{|D|!} (q(S \cup \{f\}) - q(S))$$

### Theorem [Deutch, Frost, Kimelfeld & Monet 2022]

- for any Boolean query  $q$ , computing Shapley values for  $q$  reduces in PTIME to  $\text{PQE}(q)$
- we can compute in PTIME the Shapley values of d-D circuits (bottom-up dynamic programming)

## Shapley values (2/2)

### Theorem [Deutch, Frost, Kimelfeld & Monet 2022]

- for any Boolean query  $q$ , computing Shapley values for  $q$  reduces in PTIME to  $PQE(q)$
  - we can compute in PTIME the Shapley values of d-D circuits (bottom-up dynamic programming)
- 
- There is also a notion of **Shapley value for probabilistic databases!**
    - See Karmakar, Monet, Senellart & Bressan 2024. In this case the problem is PTIME **equivalent** to PQE.
- We can compute in PTIME (probabilistic or deterministic) Shapley values for safe queries on all database, or for MSO queries on tree-like data

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database
- $\text{Res}(q, D) = \min_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ \text{s.t. } D \setminus D' \not\models q}} |D'|$ . In English: the minimum number of facts to remove from  $D$  to make the query false.

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database
- $\text{Res}(q, D) = \min_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ \text{s.t. } D \setminus D' \not\models q}} |D'|$ . In English: the minimum number of facts to remove from  $D$  to make the query false.
- Equivalently: the size of the **biggest** subdatabase of  $D$  that make **the negation of the query** true

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database
- $\text{Res}(q, D) = \min_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ \text{s.t. } D \setminus D' \not\models q}} |D'|$ . In English: the minimum number of facts to remove from  $D$  to make the query false.
- Equivalently: the size of the **biggest** subdatabase of  $D$  that make **the negation of the query** true
- **on board**: computing the maximum Hamming weight of a satisfying assignment of a d-DNNF

- $q$  a Boolean query,  $D$  a database
  - $\text{Res}(q, D) = \min_{\substack{D' \subseteq D \\ \text{s.t. } D \setminus D' \not\models q}} |D'|$ . In English: the minimum number of facts to remove from  $D$  to make the query false.
  - Equivalently: the size of the **biggest** subdatabase of  $D$  that make **the negation of the query** true
  - **on board**: computing the maximum Hamming weight of a satisfying assignment of a d-DNNF
- We can compute resilience in PTIME if we can build d-DNNFs for  $\neg q$

## ProvSQL teaser




---




- **ProvSQL**: a PostgreSQL module to compute provenance, lead by Pierre Senellart
- Can handle other semirings than the Boolean semiring
- To solve PQE/Shapley: first compute  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  as a Boolean circuit, then either
  - call a **knowledge compiler** to compile to d-DNNF
  - if the circuit's **treewidth** is small, convert it to d-DNNF using [Amarilli, Capelli, Monet & Senellart 2020]



- **ProvSQL**: a PostgreSQL module to compute provenance, lead by Pierre Senellart
- Can handle other semirings than the Boolean semiring
- To solve PQE/Shapley: first compute  $\text{Prov}(q, D)$  as a Boolean circuit, then either
  - call a **knowledge compiler** to compile to d-DNNF
  - if the circuit's **treewidth** is small, convert it to d-DNNF using [Amarilli, Capelli, Monet & Senellart 2020]

→ See **Pierre's demo on Friday!**

Thanks for your attention!

-  Antoine Amarilli, Pierre Bourhis, and Pierre Senellart.  
**Tractable lineages on treelike instances: Limits and extensions.**  
*In Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of Database Systems*, pages 355–370, 2016.
-  Antoine Amarilli, Florent Capelli, Mikaël Monet, and Pierre Senellart.  
**Connecting knowledge compilation classes with parameters.**  
*Theory of Computing Systems*, 64(5):861–914, 2020.
-  Antoine Amarilli, Mikaël Monet, and Dan Suciu.  
**The non-cancelling intersections conjecture.**  
*CoRR*, abs/2401.16210, 2024.

-  Nilesh N. Dalvi and Dan Suciu.  
**Efficient query evaluation on probabilistic databases.**  
In *VLDB*, pages 864–875. Morgan Kaufmann, 2004.
-  Nilesh N. Dalvi and Dan Suciu.  
**The dichotomy of probabilistic inference for unions of conjunctive queries.**  
*Journal of the ACM*, 59(6):30, 2012.
-  Daniel Deutch, Nave Frost, Benny Kimelfeld, and Mikaël Monet.  
**Computing the shapley value of facts in query answering.**  
In *Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Management of Data*, pages 1570–1583, 2022.

-  Tomasz Imieliński and Witold Lipski Jr.  
**Incomplete information in relational databases.**  
*Journal of the ACM (JACM)*, 31(4):761–791, 1984.
-  Pratik Karmakar, Mikaël Monet, Pierre Senellart, and Stéphane Bressan.  
**Expected shapley-like scores of boolean functions: Complexity and applications to probabilistic databases.**  
*Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data*, 2(2):1–26, 2024.